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The Khmer Way of Exile: Lessons from Three Indochinese
Wars

Craig Etcheson
University of Southern Calif omia
Introduction: The Khmer Way of Exile
The Cambodian peasant economy has been a powerful
force for continuity in Khmer society over the millenia. The once
imposing power of the Khmer imperial state had declined over the
the preceding millenium, but the conservative peasant base
continued to sustain the twin pillars of Khmer society - the
Khmer monarchy and the Theravada Buddhist monachy through the 1960s. Mysticism and survival are uniquely intertwined in the person of the Khmer monarch: as official owner of
all the land. he feeds the body; as the God-King. he feeds the
spirit. With the rituals of daily life revolving around Buddhism
and farming. and with the King in his dual role as head-of-state
and head-of-religion, the King has for many centuries represented the symbolic center of the Khmer nation. Since before
World War II, this symbolic power has been embodied in a person
named Norodom Sihanouk.
At the age of 67. Norodom Sihanouk has been at the
center of Southeast Asian politics for fifty years . Placed on the
throne of Cambodia at age eighteen by his French colonial
masters. the durable monarch has seen countless prime ministers, scores of regimes. and not a few states come and go - in
Cambodia alone. Although it has been thirty years since he
abdicated as King and twenty years since his regime was
overthrown. he is now positioning himself to return to Cambodia
as head-of-state in a new coalition government apparently
emerging from several years of incredibly Byzantine negotiations. While Journalistic commentary commonly prefaces his
name with descriptors such as "unreliable. "mercurialM and
"elusive. Mhis survival amidst a half-century of extended chaos
speaks to the power of the symbols he commands.
This half-century of chaos is delimited by historians into
three principalconflicts: the First Indochinese War (1941-1955).
mainly between the Vietnamese and the French; the Second
Indochinese War (1955-1975). between the Vietnamese and the
Americans: and the Third Indochinese War (1975-present).
between the Vietnamese and a Sino-Khmer alliance, with many
additional players in all three wars. One of the most interesting
K
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aspects of collective Cambodian political behavior over this
eriod is recurring use of the technique of the exile government
~ with Sihanouk at the center of exile action in three successive
wars. Such a pattern invites analysis. Who will prevail in the
current struggle for power in Cambodia? How have Khmer
leaders used the government-in-exile technique to defend their
rule against stronger foreign powers? What is the relationship
between the success of an exile state organization and the
symbolic attributes of the nationhood inhering in the social
formations of the Khmer people? We will explore these questions
by looking to Cambodian history for clues.
The Byzantine maneuvering of politicians in the Third
Indochinese War is entirely consistent with the patterns and
dynamics of regional political interaction in all three Indochinese
conllicts. In the First Indochinese War. Sihanouk skillfully used
the existence ofrebels and exile organizations on the left and the
right of the Cambodian political spectrum to pressure the French
colonialists into concessions hastening Cambodian independence. In the Second Indochinese War. Sihanouk was overthrown
by his ministers and promptly formed an exile government with
his former adversary. the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP).
also known as the "Khmer Rouge." In the Third Indochinese War.
the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge state of Democratic
Kampuchea. bringing to power a group of Khmer exiles from
Democratic Kampuchea. and prompting Sihanouk to again form
an exile government with the KCP.
What motivates Khmer leaders to form exile governments? In principle. at least three distinct abstract purposes
suggest themselves as possible explanations. In the first war.
anti-colonialism against the French was cited by all participants
as the principal motive; in the second war. domestic rivalry
among numerous Khmer factions was clearly an important
factor; and in the third and recent war. struggle against the
occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops was touted by the
thrne main resistance factions as the over-riding reason for
fighting. In practice. however. the motives are much less clearly
defined than the three clear-cut explanations of anti-colonialism. domestic rivalry. and anti-occupation. In fact. elements of
all three purposes played important roles in each of the three
Indochinese Wars of the twentieth century.
In that first Indochinese struggle. it was not only the
Khmer radicals who resisted the legal. French colonial Cambodian government. Following the French reassertion of colonial
power in Indochina after World War II, Cambodians across the
political spectrum struggled for independence from France.
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Radical and conservative groups allke resorted to paramil itary
action against French interests, raising the pressure on the
colonialists and creating an opening that young King Sihano uk
skillfully exploited. Leading independence-minded politicia ns of
the left and the light in Cambodian politics soon found the mselves frozen out of the action by Sihanouk's mastery of his
position as the symbolic center of the nation. He succee ded in
winning independence from France for Cambodia at the Geneva
Conference in 1954, a triumph so complete that he contin ued to
dominate Cambodian politics through the 1950s and 1960s. In
this period, Sihanouk practiced an authorttarian politics of the
center, including a liberal employment of securtty forces that
reduced the internal Cambodian left to a dwindling extincti on .
Their defenselessness against the government convinced some
Cambodian revolutionairies that armed resistance was nece ssary .
In the early years of the Second Indochinese War. King
(later, Prince) Sihanouk managed to insulate his country from
the worst of the violence raking Vietnam and Laos. When the
Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP) finally launched arme d
struggle in 1968, they had little success in the first two years on
their own. But growing discontent among the Khmer elite over
Vietnamese occupation oflarge tracts in the eastern provinces of
the country soon led to a military coup against Sihanouk in 1970 .
The KCP leaped at the opportunity to form a broad partners hip
with the overthrown prtnce and assorted left-leaning soc ial
democratic elements. This proved to be the key to success, and
the undoing of the nearly two thousand years of traditi on
represented by Sihanouk. Under the banner of the exiled Royal
GovernmentfortheNatlonalUnificationofKampuchea(GRU
NK),
the Khmer communists marched to victory in 1975 only to
abruptly liquidate their partners and seize absolute power . The
KCP had learned well the lesson of the First Indochinese War. The
center was necessary to attain victory, but it must be destroye d
the moment victory is achieved or else it may tum and destroy the
revolution.
The Third Indochinese War came close on the heels of th e
second . In 1979, only three years and two days after the foundin g
of their state, Democratic Kampuchea. Khmer Rouge aggress ion
against Vietnam precipitated their rout from power by the
Vietnamese army. This time, more reluctantly, the Khmer Roug e
gradually maneuvered to assemble a remarkably similar "coalitionn partnership consisting of Prince Sihanouk , social dem ocratic elements, and other groups. True to their hubris-soake d
form. the Khmer Rouge did not bother to wait until victory to
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begin liquidating their coalition partners. The behavior of the
l{hmer Rouge toward their coalition partners in the Third Indochinese War has been consistent with their strategy in the
second Indochinese War. When they are in power the policy is
systematic purge and in the chaos of wartime the policy is
random ambush . Despite this fratricidal spirit among the coaliuon partners. the coalition appeared to be moving slowly toward
an international settlement which would bring all or part of it to
power in Phnom Penh . Exactly which part or parts end up coming
to power in Cambodia is crucial to the future social order of the
country.
History may be on the verge of repeating itself in Cambodia. But which history will it be? That of the First Indochinese
war. with its relatively- and I emphasize relative, for when in
power Sihanouk did not shrink from the use of force - benign
centrist solution? Or. that of the Second Indochinese War. an
extremist solution followed by purges. execution and starvation
on a grand scale? In a number of respects the situation of the
Khmer exile community in the Third Indochinese War resembles
that of the First Indochinese War more than that of the Second
Indochinese War . The outcome for Cambodia of the Third Indochinese War will be determined by the balance of forces within
the disintegrating exile regime, the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). between the CGDK factions
and the existing weak government in Phnom Penh. and among
the interested regional and global powers. Khmer politicians
have a history of successfully using the technique of a government-in -exile. if not to resolve conflict, at least to transform the
conditions of violence from external threat to civil war. It appears
that in at least this one respect, the outcome of the Third
Indochinese War will parallel that of the first two: exile groups
seem likely to achieve national power in Cambodia. In other
respects. the outcome of the Third Indochinese War is likely to be
unique in the history of Indochina's conflicts.

Khmer Issarak Strategy in First Indochinese War
As the authority of the French empire collapsed during
World War II. Cambodians anxious for independence seized the
opportunity to establish a free government. With some intrigue
on the part of the Japanese. early in 1945 a group of Khmer
partisans led by Son Ngoc Thanh succeeded in setting up a shortlived "free democratic" Cambodian government. At the end of the
war , however. the allies decided that French colonial forces
remaining in Indochina were well-positioned to disarm and
arrest the Japanese occupation forces. The French also arrested
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"trouble-makers" like Son Ngoc Thanh. The sequence of rising
hopes for independence followed by colonial re-occupation set
the stage for the First Indochinese War, and spawned resistance
movements throughout Indochina. Depending on how one counts
- and who is counting - there were at least two, maybe three ,
four, or more identifiable Cambodian exile governments during
the First Indochinese War. The most important of these exile
groups were collectively known as the "Khiner Issarak" (or "Free
Khmer") even though the so-named groups represented various
wide-ranging and often completely contradictory interests from
republican to communist, Siamese-leaning to Vietnamese-leaning.
Some of the conflicting tendencies in Cambodian politics
that helped push Cambodia toward independence from France
after World War II are illustrated in the activities of two men with
confusingly similar names: Son Ngoc Thanh and Son Ngoc Minh .
To add to the confusion, both men led largely ineffectual rival
exile governments on the right and the left (respectively) during
the First Indochinese War. While their exile governments never
came close to achieving national power, they played vital roles in
the Cambodian movement for independence from France.
Son Ngoc Thanh was the more prominent of the two.
representing the interests of the French-educated intellectual
class with Western preferences. His career is bracketed with two
equally brief and disastrous stints as Prime Minister. first in the
wartime free Khmer government of 1945, and then in the wartime
Khmer Republican government of 1972. He had earned the
eternal ire of the King by pushing Sihanouk aside in forming the
1945 free democratic government, and Sihanouk returned the
favor by seeing Thanh imprisoned and exiled to France after the
war. Shortly after his return to Cambodia in 1951. Thanh fled the
capitol and formed a right-leaning exile government in the
northern border province of Siem Reap.• Although Sihanouk
repeatedly sent his army to attack Thanh ·s bases. with Thai
assistance Thanh perservered for several years. Finally after
failing to win recognition at the Geneva Convention of 1954. he
gave up his exile quest and accepted new patrons. Thanh himself
was irrepressible in his quest for national leadership, variously
allying himself with the Japanese, the Siamese, the Vietnamese,
and the Americans in repeated attempts to achieve the leadership role he believed was his destiny. Although foreign sponsorship seems to be a prerequisite for the success of a Khmer exile
government. and though Thanh clearly understood this, still he
lacked a vital ingredient: the symbolic Khmer center.
Son Ngoc Minh faced the internal legitimacy problem to
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an even greater degree. A former Buddhist monk from the lost
unperial Khmer provinces now known as southern Vietnam,
Minh selected his nom de guerre in part to evoke Son Ngoc
Thanh's well-established rebel image and in part to ameliorate
bis possibly suspect Vietnamese connections. This was a legitimate concern. because until 1951 the Cambodian communist
operated largely as a branch of the Vietnamese party. But the
l{hmer communist movement had grown considerably since the
French returned in 1946, particularly but not exclusively in the
eastern provinces along the border with Vietnam. By the time the
Khmer communists split from the Vietnamese Workers Party in
1951 to form the independent Khmer People's Party, Minh had
achieved leadership of a vibrant movement,• and by 1952 he
became President of the little-remembered exile Khmer Resistance Government. However, Minh's problem with internal legitimacy within Cambodia would prove disastrous in the negotiations leading to Cambodian independence, where Sihanouk
would derisively dismiss Minh's exile movement with the labels
wKhmer Rouge" and "Khmer Viet Minh," evoking both their
communist and Vietnamese connections.
Sihanouk deftly maneuvered among the various tendencies of these exile governments, playing them off one against
another and against interested foreign powers. He did this so
expertly that he managed to achieve near-dictatorial powers.
Neartheclimaxofhis "Royal Crusade for Independence," in mid1953 Sihanouk went into voluntary "exile" first in Thailand and
then in Siem Reap province, the same province where Son Ngoc
Thanh with the aid of Thai authorities proclaimed an independence movement. The French already feared that the rightist proSiamese Son Ngoc Thanh was allied to the leftist pro-Vietnamese
Son Ngoc Minh. The terrifying if absurd vision of a united front
among Cambodian monarchists, democrats and communists
along with their respective Vietnamese, Laotian, and Siamese
allies moved the French. Within a matter of months they yielded
to the King's demands for autonomy. Thus did Sihanouk learn a
lesson about using one's enemies. It was a lesson which would
serve him poorly in the next Indochinese War.
The French sued for peace, and the interested parties
converged on Geneva early in 1954 to begin positioning for the
settlement. In the days leading up to the Geneva Conference a
flurry of activity continued to increase the pressure on the
beleaguered French government. On May 3, Son Ngoc Minh
formally demanded representation for his Khmer Resistance
Government at the conference table in Geneva .s As if to underline the seriousness of the resistance, on May 7, the eve of the
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conference, the French ganison at Dien Bien Phu fell to Genera}
Giap's siege. At the opening session of the conference the next
morning, Vietnamese delegate Pham Van Dong forcefully represented the demands ofMinh's exile government for recognition,
a demand rejected both by the French and Royal Khmer delegates . This contributed to an immediate deadlock of the conference, leading soon to the collapse of the French government.
Action then shifted as a new French government emerged and its
leader, Pierre Mendes-France, began negotiating behind the
scenes with China's Chou En-Lai to find the solution to the
puzzle. The Chinese, while eager to see a dilTusion of colonial
power on their southern flank, had conflicting interests. On the
one hand, the modem interests of proletarian internationalism
dictated unwavering Chinese support for the battlefield sacrifices of their Vietnamese brothers. On the other hand, the
ancient interests of imperial power dictated that whatever was
necessary be done to prevent consolidation of an independent
Vietnam holding sway over all Indochina. Traditional interests
would carry the day. After a quiet meeting in southern China
between Chou En-lai and Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh. Pham
Van Dong received new instructions in Geneva. There would be
partition in Vietnam, and there would be no recognition for the
resistance movement in Kampuchea, despite the fact that resistance forces held fully two-thirds of the county -side in both
Vietnam and Kampuchea . The resentments and suspicions
sown among Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodian communists
at the conference ending the First Indochinese War simmered
and smouldered for twenty years before exploding into combat in
the Third Indochinese War .
In sum, for a time Son Tgoc Thanh's Issarak exile
government of the First Indochinese War did find an external
host in Thailand, but the Siamese proved uncommitted in the
long run and provided no serious financial or military backing to
the would-be Khmer rebels . The Vietnamese likewise provided
encouragement and guidance for their protegee, Son Ngoc Minh ·s
Khmer Resistance Government, but pulled that support the
moment their own strategic interests so dictated . This should be
viewed as a major factor in the failure of the Cambodian exile
governments to achieve power on their own terms in the First
Indochinese War . An enthusiastic and steadfast external patron
seems to be necessary for a Khmer exile government to come to
power.
The lack of internal legitimacy among the populace must
be viewed as a secondary strategic reason for the failure of the
Khmer exile governments in the First Indochinese War . They
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could not command the allegiance of the symbolic center. Viewed
in terms of their historical signillcance, these exile governments
were important not in and of themselves, but rather as foils for
Sihanouk to use in his fencing with domineering foreign powers.
With the "Khmer Viet Minh" forces on the left, and the "Khmer
Jssarak" forces on the rtght, Sihanouk naturally commanded the
center. Because the traditional locus of political and religious
authority resided in the King, Sihanouk easily prevailed. It was
a lesson that most of the participants never forgot: even if you
out-organize the opposition and stake out the moral highground, you must control the symbols of nationhood or you will
succeed neither with the Cambodian people nor with the international community.
Khmer Rouge Strategy in Second Indochinese War
The principal issue behind the Second Indochinese War
concerned who would rule the Vietnamese people. Sihanouk had
struggled valiantly through the 1960s to insulate his tiny Royal
state of Cambodia from the devastation of the VietnameseAmerican war, but after his overthrow in 1970 the flames
engulfed Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk had been battling a small
domestic guerilla insurgency led by the heretofore inept Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP), but when the deposed monarch
abruptly Joined forces with the communists in the exiled Royal
Government of Khmer National Unification, their movement
exploded across the nation and literally tore the existing social
order to bits. It was an impressive achievement, considering that
Pol Pot's KCP had been founded only a mere ten years before.
In 1961, the ten year old Khmer People's Party was
reconstituted as the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP).
albeit one that consisted of little more than a central committee.
The Khmer People's Party had been decimated by Sihanouk's
security forces, aided by well-placed spies through the 1950s.
The tiny new KCP had no effect on the inability of the party to
recruit a mass grass-roots following in the cities or any significant following at all among the predominant ethnic Khmer rural
population. The general failure of attempts to organize among
both the urban and rural populations lent support to the
Vietnamese Communist Party analysis of the situation, which
Son Ngoc Minh's now-defunct Khmer People's Party had shared.
This line held that Cambodia had not reached the requisite stage
of socio-economic development to support socialist revolution.
and therefore the proper role of progressive elements of Cambodian society was to reinforce Sihanouk's anti-imperialist (read
anU-U.S.) tendencies, and support the revolutionary struggle in
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Vietnam . This analysis was widely held within the Kampuche an
Communist Party, although it was not shared by a cruc ial
leadership cllque. Pol Pot (#1 in the KCP) and Ieng Sary (#3)
believed that armed struggle would ultimately be require d .
Nonetheless, the majority opinion prevailed and the princ ipal
activities pursued by the party in early 1960s concerned pro pa ganda and agitation, mainly among the publlc and priv ate
schools of the larger cities in Cambodia. The party was in no way
prepared for war when events early in 1967 forced them to rev ise
their strategy from political struggle to armed struggle.
What was essentially a limited tax rebellion am ong
peasants in the northwestern agricultural province of Batta m bang in January 1967 became a major turning point in the
history of the KCP. While the party held fast to the line that th e
people were not ready for armed revolt, peasant masses more or
less spontaneously took up arms against the govenrment. Th us ,
the so-called Samlaut Rebelllon presented the KCP with a spec ies
of challenge which is the death of many organizations: the bas ic
doctrinal assumption was suddenly and undeniably refuted by
reality. The Khmer Rouge successfully adapted by claiming the
rebellion as their own and declaring (retroactive) armed strugg le.
These events marked the beginning of a two year period of slow
and only marginally effective guerrilla struggle by a party whic h
had not seriously begun to contemplate, let alone prepare for ,
war. Samlaut also had a very important internal political conse quence within the Kampuchean Communist Party: it reinforce d
the position of the "Pol Pot" group in the Central Committee, who
had argued that only armed rebellion could break the combine d
grips of feudal, colonial, commercial and imperial enemies of
Kampuchea. This tum of events helped entrench Pol Pot's allies
in key positions throughout the revolutionary apparatus of th e
Kampuchean Communist Party.
The Khmer Rouge generally proved inept at exploiting the
splendid opening offered by peasant resentment in Battamba ng
and other provinces. A little ground was gained in remote and
historically rebellious areas, but at the rate sustained in 1968
and 1969, it would have been a very long struggle, one not at all
certain of success. Yet the rate of change in Cambodia was about
to go off of the scale. The 1970 coup d'etat against Noro dom
Sihanouk by Sirik Matak and Lon Nol was a watershed event in
the political history of the Second Indochinese War, for this act
cataclysmically transformed the international strategic land scape of the region, with catastrophic consequences for the
existing social order in Kampuchea. Prior to the coup, the Khmer
Rouge had struggled against Sihanouk's regime alone with
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1.rtually no assistance from their supposedly fraternal brother
;arties tn the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC).
and North and South Vietnam. After the coup, Sihanouk. the
PRC. and the Vietnamese all suddenly found it in their interests
to be of considerable assistance to the struggling Cambodian
revolutionaries. The coup also set the stage for formation of a
coalition government-in-exile which would come to power after a
vicious fiVe-year civil war.
Norodom Sihanouk was the most important element in
the victory, and the key to the entire Khmer Rouge strategy.
Sihanouk could deliver both Khmer peasants and Western
nations . The Vietnamese were also very important in the new
strategy. for when Lon Nol and Sirik Matak suddenly changed
Sihanouk's policy of covert cooperation with the Vietnamese
revolutionaries to a policy of confrontation and ultimatum, the
Vietnamese did not hesitate lo tum and pummel the new-born
Khmer Republic . Notwithstanding repeated Khmer Rouge claims
of military prowess. this allowed the Khmer Rouge a relatively
smooth cruise to victory. The government of the People's Republic of China had also found it convenient to cooperate with
Sihanouk's government, but after Sihanouk was deposed there
was no longer any reason to support the now clearly reactionary
Cambodian regime and continue to neglect proper fraternal
relations with the Kampuchean Communist Party . The Chinese
proved to be the most important ally in the long run when they
provided a lifeboat for the apocalypse ten years later. Both the
Vietnamese and the Chinese communists had tacitly and otherwise assisted Sihanouk in his war with the Kampuchean communists, and so it was an astonishing transformation of the
international strategic landscape when these banes of the KCP's
existence suddenly became eager allies in th ~ Khmer Rouge plan
to seize power.
The KCP instituted a number of tactical innovations in
their strategy to cope with the portentious changes in the
political terrain of Southeast Asia wrought by the 1970 coup
d'etat in Cambodia. The most important innovations concerned
the rapid construction of internal, external. and international
united fronts. This complex of three interlocking organizations
formed the public face of the revolution. The internal united front
with Sihanouk - called FUNK (the National United Front for
Kampuchea) - functioned mainly as a recruitment arm, but was
perceived by the Khmer Rouge as completely irrelevant upon
victory. The external united front, the nominal exile government.
came to be called by the acronym. GRUNK (Royal Government of
Khmer National Unification); GRUNKfunctioned to legitimize the
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revolution in the regional and international arenas . Accordingly,
in theory. the leadership of GRUNK was evenly divided between
followers of Sihanouk and followers of the KCP. In practice
however, Sihanouk's people got mostly diplomatic posts anct
titles conferring no real authority within the revolution. The
international united front - a putative alliance among the
revolutionaries in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea call UFTip
(the United Front of the Three Indochinese Peoples) - was the
least significant of the fronts. Nominally representing the common interests of the Indochinese revolutionary movements in
resisting "U.S. imperialism," UFTIP was in reality a chimera in
the shadows of which Laotian. Vietnamese, and Khmer revolutionary organizations separately pursued their individual selfinterested ends. The KCP benefited from this liaison. to some
extent from the propaganda advantage. but principally from a
cornucopia of military aid from the Vietnamese communists. The
three united front organizations played crucial social, political.
propaganda , diplomatic, and recruitment functions, but real
power on the ground in Cambodia was always held by the army:
PFI.ANK (the People's National Liberation Armed Forces of
Kampuchea) .
PFI.ANK was always completely under the control of
members of the secret Central Committee of the KCP. However,
winning the war was only the first task assigned to PFI.ANK.The
most crucial political issue in Kampuchea became who controls
the security apparatus. The Central Committee of the Kampuchean Communist Party maintained direct personal control of the
army units. but exactly which members of the Central Committee held command became a life and death matter in the months
following victory . In 1970 - 1973, however, it was Vietnamese
military aid that kept the revolutionary organizations growing.
This military aid came not only in the form of advisors and arms,
but in many cases direct military intervention to fight the fights
of the young PFI.ANK, which until 1973 was not at all prepared
to shoulder the burden of the civil war with it's own resources.
For many in academia and the press, the romanticism in
the image of a rebel prince leading a peasant revolution against
a corrupt neo-colonial quisling regime was too much to resist.•
But Sihanouk 's attempt to relive his triumph in using exile
governments during his "Royal Crusade for Independence" from
France in the early 1950s was foredoomed to a humiliating
failure . The Khmer Rouge used the King with a mastery and
subtlety seldom seen in modern political history. This failure did
much to reinforce Sihanouk's image as an unreliable vainglorious fool. It also did much to enshrine the Khmer Rouge external
104

perception and internal self-image as infallably brilliant politicians and revolutionaries. Sihanouk may yet surprise his critics;
so may the Khmer Rouge.
The practice of the Khmer Rouge in the Second Indochinese War was to unify the country under the Sihanouk-led
banners of FUNK and GRUNK. and then to liquidate all contenders for power with their army. the PF LANK. This was reflected in
Khmer Rouge theory in the notion of "mastery." Central to their
doctrine. mastery was expressed in the overblown self-confidence of their peasant troops. One gets a better sense of the
radicalism of the Khmer Rouge revolution. and how this psychological sense of power evolved in the movement. by seeing how
they created and used social institutions to transform the social
and political culture of the nation in a very brief period.
FUNK was the key to controlling the peasantry. The
function of FUNK was to convince the deeply traditional and
conservative peasantry the the revolution represented the interests of the monarchy and the monachy; but there was much
more. Their methods demonstrate that the Khmer Rouge were
social engineers who planned ahead. With a view to the future.
the Khmer Rouge focused on children and young adults. One of
the many organizations operated by FUNK was the Patriotic
Youth Organization (PYA). The enormous number of young
peasants who joined the revolution out of respect for the appeals
of the exiled former King Sihanouk and the traditional values
that he embodied were funneled into the PYA. Naturally. the
values these youngsters had been raised with were considerably
at odds with the inner program of the KCP Central Committee.
The Khmer Rouge devised the PYA system to winnow a few
hopeful cases from the masses being readied to die for the
revolution. A system of PYAyouth training camps was founded,
where the young peasants were drilled in elementary military
technique and basic revolutionary doctrine. As one analyst
reported at the time, "returning youngsters fiercely condemned
religion and custom, rejected paternal authority and showed a
marked confidence in mechanical weapons and a rejection of the
mystical."• Apparently this training was effective. and the combat
performance of these child-soldiers impressed even seasoned
warriors. As Sihanouk put it, the child-soldiers were trained to
believe that the society against which they fought - and which
they came to understand that Sihanouk more than anyone else
represented - was "despicable. contemptible. corrupt. unjust
and oppressive in the extreme."•
Those who distinguished themselves in battle and were
deemed to possess potential for the party might be advanced to
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membership in theAlHance of Communist Youth of Kam puchea
(known by it's Khmer acronym. Yuv. K.K.). As an official orga n of
the KCP. the Yuv. K.K. was a covert organization, entirely secret.
The 1973 inaugural issue of the Yuv. K.K. propaganda organ
stated the aim of the organization as "causing the ado ption"
among the youth of Kampuchea "a new revolutionaryworldvt ew.",
These young warriors, known in Khmer Rouge party lexic on as
"the dictatorial instrument of the party," became the shock
troops of the new order, assigned after the war to herd the m asses
of workers from work site to work site. In 1975 victory was
declared under the GRUNK flag, but PFLANKwas in contr ol. The
PFLANK was the cutting edge of revolution, but raw force was
combined with sophisticated organization and propaganda by
the theorists and social engineers of Khmer Rouge revoluti on.
In summary, the Kampuchean Communist Party st rategy for the Second Indochinese War involved forming an exile
coalition government. marginalizing the coalition while winni ng
the civil war, and seizing absolute power. This series of so phis ticated procedures secured the transformation of their exile
government into a sovereign nation-state during and after the
Second Indochinese War. The first problem was to gain control
of the key symbolic cultural icons of the nation - the King, the
Buddhist monks, the capitol, and the ruins in the countrys ide.
These in hand. the process of changing the association in
people's minds between the symbols of nationhood and the
revolution could begin in earnest. This elaborate program (known
as "De-Sihanoukization") began in some of the liberated areas as
early as 1973. 8 Simultaneously. the process of physically liquidating all competing apparati within the FUNK organiza tion
commenced. This began with liquidation of all ethnic Vietname se
servtng in the revolutionary organizations, and proceeded out ward in waves through first the various front organizations and
finally the party itself. All who did not maintain the confidence of
the KCP security apparat would be "disappeared." Effective
control of the FUNK organization gradually came into the han ds
of the Khmer Rouge through this kind of creeping administra tive
coup d'etat, so that eventually all activity except Sihan ouk's
diplomatic corps in Bejing was controlled on the groun d incountry by trusted party members. Norodom Sihanouk, whil e no
more than a figurehead, proVided the revolution with unp roblematical possession of the symbolic center of the nation. This
brought along not only the people of Cambodia, but als o the
international community. When this had been accomplishe d , it
was possible to begin the marginalization of the internal diplomatic cover represented by Sihanouk's entourage in China. Once
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this was done. Cambodia belonged to Pol Pot. The resulting state
of Democratic Kampuchea, founded in the wake of the KCP
victory, would shock the world with its extremism and start the
Third Indochinese War.
cGDK Strategy in Third Indochinese

War
On the surlace, the two main questions in the Third
Indochinese War were 1) When would the Vietnamese army leave
cambodia ; and 2) What will happen to the Cambodian regime
that the Vietnamese plan to leave behind? The Vietnamese
answered the first of these two questions when they announced
in April 1989 that they would complete the pullout of their troops
within siX months. The second question doesn't have so simple
an answer , bu t the resolution of the first question set a clock to
ticking toward an answer to the second.
The end of 1978 came grimly to a belligerent Democratic
Kampuchea . Afteryears of terror and mismanagement under the
Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian people were in no mood to assist
in the defense of the nation. Repeated rounds of concentric
purges throughout all levels of the KCP for more than five years
had left it in no condition to lead a defense of the homeland . When
the Vietnamese finally responded to Pol Pot's border raids with
a full scale invasion, they found a nation ready for collapse.
During the week before Christmas, the Vietnamese used heavy
armor and artillery with air support to attack and decimate the
massed Democratic Kampuchean defenses in Svay Rieng and
Kompong Thom provinces. Invading Vietnamese commanders
then drove straight for Phnom Penh. skirting strong points of the
Democratic Kampuchean army, and aiming for the heart of the
nation . The invasion force took the capital on January 7, 1979,
less than two weeks after the start of the campaign . The
government of Democratic Kampuchea literally took to the hills,
retreating with essential political and administrative personnel
to mountain redouts in remote areas of the Thai -Kampuchean
border . Pol Pot correctly calculated that his forces could hold out
indefinitely in this traditional rebel region.
The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). founded in
the wake of the Vietnamese occupation in 1979, had its origins
in an exile movement sponsored by Vietnam and largely made up
of former officers, cadre and citizens of Democratic Kampuchea
who fled to Vietnam to escape Pol Pot's purges during the late
1970s. In the decade between the invasion of Cambodia and the
decision to change the name of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to the State of Cambodia, the leaders of that hapless captive
nation -state bravely toiled at such recovery as they could man107

age in the killing fields left behind by Pol Pot's retreat ing
revolution.• Considerable progress was made in improving the
welfare and conditions of the Khmer people. Virtually all of the
excesses of the Khmer Rouge era were eliminated, and a mar k etbased economic recovery and a revival of religion and touris m
has been brought underway. 10
Nonetheless. the now-exiled government of Democra tic
Kampuchea continued to exist and resist. During the summe r of
1979 a tribunal in Phnom Penh convicted Pol Pot and his sec ond in-command, Ieng Sary. of genocide. Then. in the first of what h as
became an almost ritualistic annual autumn challenge to the
credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean representative s to
the United Nations, the Chairman of the People's Republic of
Kampuchea's Council of State. Heng Samrin. argued tha t the
record of Khmer Rouge brutality disqualified them from govern ing. The United Nations credentials committee. however. deci ded
to award the Cambodian seat to the representatives of Demo cratic Kampuchea, in respect of the principle that nation-s tates
shall not be overthrown by neighboring force of arms. Thus did
Pol Pot survive as the leader of the legal and wlegitimate"
government of Cambodia. But not entirely without challe nge
from the exile community.
On October 9, 1979, Son Sann crossed over the Th ai
border a short distance into Cambodia, and declared the existence on Khmer soil of the Khmer People's National Liberati on
Front (KPNLF). Son Sann had been a leader in Sihano uk's
governments in the 1960s. at one point briefly rising to the post
of Prime Minister. and returned to Cambodian politics during the
period of the Khmer Republic in the early 1970s. Under the
banner of the KPNLF, Sann proceeded to unify a number of rebel
bands that had been operating along the Thai-Cambo dian
frontier since the end of the Second Indochinese War. obtain ing
1,1 the process a string of strategic bases ringing the Cambod ian
·c,order. Sann hoped to offer himself as a "third force," an
alternative between the Vietnamese supported government in
Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge. Unfortunately, the very
nature of his command - essentially a dispersed collectio n of
armed bandits, mercenaries, ousted generals, the odd ideali st.
and assorted rilT-rafI - invited chaos and insubordination . The
resulting contention was so intense that by 1981 comma nd
squabbles had robbed his organization of virtually all milita ry
capability to operate in-country.
Norodom Sihanouk had been held under house arre st
throughout the reign of Democratic Kampuchea, but soon after
. the rout of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 he managed to escape the ir
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control. Operating independently once again, he tmmediately
began to position himself as the compromise solution to the
Vietnamese invasion and "puppet" regime. He reasoned that he
had worked with the Vietnamese before and could do it again;
likewiSe. he had lots of old friends among the Chinese. No other
internationally acceptable party could claim such credentials.
But he was mistaken. Sihanouk miscalculated the extent of
support which would be offered by the People's Republic of China
to their fraternal friends in the Kampuchean Communist Party.
apparently forgetting that when Deng Xiaoping welcomed a
trtumphant Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to Bejing in October 1977, the
relationship between the communist parties of Cambodia and
China was described as "Unbreakable." According to one analyst. this description had been used only once before, in the case
of China's close alliance with Albania. 11 Sihanouk also miscalculated with respect to the Vietnamese. During the First and
second Indochinese Wars. Sihanouk had closely cooperated
with Vietnamese leaders like Pham Van Dong in repelling first the
French and then the Americans. But at the outset of the Third
Indochinese War. Pham Van Dong began publicly declaring that
his old friend Sihanouk was "a finished man. "11 What must have
shocked Sihanouk the most. however, was the fact that tmmediately after the Vietnamese invasion. the United States of America
threw its support behind Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge. President
Carter's National Security Advisor Brzezinski recalled that in the
spring of 1979, "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I
encouraged the Thai to help the D.K. "1• The Reagan administration continued this covert policy. Soon Pol Pot's guerilla's were
happily modeling US-issue combat gear for the international
press. With the US. the PRC, the USSR and the Vietnamese all
studiously attempting to ignore him, Sihanouk decided by the
beginning of 1981 that he had better reconsider his "lone wolf"
approach . Soon he was talking with Son Sann about forming a
united front.
Meanwhile. Pol Pot took a dim view of Sihanouk's and
Sann's claims and armies. Moreover, the Democratic Kampuchean resistance in the remote hills along the Thai-Kampuchean
border continued to suffer attrition and lose territory to the
Vietnamese invasion forces. The National Army of Democratic
Kampuchea was increasingly dispersed, diSorganized, and
demoralized. By 1981 their strength was down to less than fifty
thousand fighters, a fraction of their pre-invasion force, with no
heavy weapons and irregular supplies. The continuing decline of
the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)and their
rather complete lack of success in defending the territorial
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bservers to take the "Kampuchean Problem" seriously. Pol Pot's
~ADK army spent much of it's time attacking Sihanouk's Army
ofNat10nalist Sihanoukians (ANS)and Son Sann's Khmer People's
National Liberation Front (KPNLF).who were busy unifying and
then re-segregating their respective armies. Son Sann lost the
leadership role of his faction several times in "camp coups" by his
subordinates, only to invariably regain command at some later
date due to continued disagreement in KPNLF ranks. Sihanouk
has "quit" as head of the coalition government several times. and
threatens to quit with a dizzying regularity. Pol Pot has repeatedly publicly "retired to academia" as part of the Democratic
Ka111puchean negotiating strategy to de-emphasize their unpopular leader. though it is unclear how much longer this tactic
will remain effective. It is remarkable that despite this fractious
and trregular behavior, the coalition seems to be progressing
toward achievement of its goals.
One of the key elements of Khmer Rouge strategy during
the Second Indochinese War had been total secrecy and concealment of the revolutionary apparatus. This almost obsessive
concern with secrecy was so religiously applied that it extended
to years of denial that there was a communist party behind the
peasant revolution. This avoided frightening simple peasants, or
confusing international supporters who were committed to noncommunist members of FUNK and GRUNK. Known only as
".Angkar" (The Organization). the communists went through the
entire war without publicizing their program beyond the ranks of
their own committed cadre. Not until September 1977, two and
one half years after victory. did the Khmer Rouge officially reveal
the existence of the Kampuchean Communist Party.
This tactic has been adopted for the Third Indochinese
War, as well. However, to conceal the existence of the heretofore
ruling party apparatus, and convincingly deny the existence of
the party. extreme measures were required. On December 7,
1981, the Kampuchean Communist Party announced that it was
officially dissolving itself. This had both tactical and strategic
advantages. It's harder for enemies to destroy an organization
that officially doesn't exist. and the potential to scare the
Cambodian people with frightening memories of the prior regime
was reduced with the covert approach. Moreover, this device
allowed potential coalition partners to save face by arguing that
they were not Joining up with communists.
Throughout their years ofrevolution and power, roughly
from 1968 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge showed no mercy on their
opponents. real or suspected. The pattern has persisted since the
formation of the CGDK in 1982. Population control is draconian
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integrity of Democratic Kampchea against Vietnamese designs
began to alarm their Chinese sponsors. Moreover. the apparent
success of Vietnam in imposing suzerainty over the entire
Indochinese Peninsula. and her representatives· frequent and
loud assertions regarding the "irreversibility of the situation ..
began to inspire alarm in some Association for Southeast Asia~
Nations (ASEAN)states. Thailand was especially alarmed, finding it's armed forces in combat with Vietnamese forces in pursuit
of retreating or retired resistance guerillas and base areas. The
Thai's had already been considerably inconvenienced by the
Khmer refugee problem along the border. With the arrival of the
army of the traditional Vietnamese enemy at and crossing ThalCambodian the border, the annoyance turned into an active
search for ways to push the Cambodians back to Cambodia and
the Vietnamese back to Vietnam.
Largely at the urging of the Chinese and Siamese, then,
inducements began to accumulate early in 1981 for formal
cooperation among the various groups opposing the Vietnamese
and their vassal in Kampuchea. The Chinese and Siamese
orchestrated an international campaign that over the course of
the year resulted in widespread pressures . The United States,
Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Australia. and the European Economic Community all promised to provide aid to both Sihanouk's
and Sann's groups if they would form a united front coalition of
all the resistance groups. The Chinese agreed to increase funding
to all three factions if they would unite against the "Vietnamese
threat." After seemingly interminable diplomatic maneuvering,
face-saving title changes and personnel shuffies, and the bogus
dissolution of the Kampuchean Communist Party. the three
resistance groups finally agreed in June 1982 to form the
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The
agreement declaring the coalition was a carefully negotiated
document designed to preserve the political identities and organizational independence of the three resistance groups. Khieu
Samphan, ably representing the interests of the Pol Pot group,
insisted on a priority clause preserving the sovereignty of Democratic Kampuchea: "... in the event that an impasse has developed
which renders the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea inoperative ... the current state of DK led by Mr. Khieu
Samphan will have the right to resume its activities as the sole
legal and legitimate state of Kampuchea ...,.
In a maze of diplomatic and military maneuvers over the
course of the next seven years, the three partners of the coalition
government of Democratic Kampuchea engaged in such bizarre
and convoluted contortions that it became difficult for outside
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in the refugee camps run by the National Army of Democratic
Kampuchea. 15 Treatment of those Cambodians not directly under
NADKcontrol ls reportedly harsher yet. As for the armies loyal to
Sihanouk and Sann, the NADK's consistent goal has been to
liquidate them before they have a chance to grow. The NADKhas
reveled in ambushing its allies, devising all manner of ruse to
entrap and inflict casualties on Sihanouk's ANS and Sann's
KPNLF. As if to make the NADK's mission simpler. internal
dissension combined with Vietnamese militaxy assaults caused
Son Sann's army to virtually disintegrate in 1986-1987. Unfortunately for the Khmer Rouge, however, many of the stragglers
rallied to Sihanouk's ANS. which is now stronger than ever.
Nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge have several reasons to
believe that their strategy for the Third Indochinese War is
succeeding. First, they have survived. Second, they have coopled
both socialist patrons (the PRC) and western patrons IASEAN
and the United States) into facilitating their supply for a ten-year
long militaxy confrontation with the Vietnamese. Third, they
have created the general assumption that the current government cannot survive the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, ensuring
a role for the coalition government. Finally. a steady flow of arms
and aid has enabled the Khmer Rouge to stockpile firepower for
action once the hated hereditaxy enemy completes its military
withdrawal. The Khmer Rouge are well-positioned to begin
employment of violence in earnest against contenders to power
within Cambodia.
It is apparent then that as states go, the Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea is indeed an unusual
regime. Tom by combat among its factions and possessing little
territory and few citizens, it is nonetheless positioned to return
in whole or in part to the national capitol by virtue of its two
principal resources: Sihanouk's heritage of legitimacy and the
Khmer Rouge army. The Khmer Rouge political movement has
shown both by its actions and by its declared doctrine for more
than twenty years that it believes in force. They take literally
Mao's saying that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.
Thus, Sihanouk was the key to their survival during the decade
of exile, when their options for coercion were limited. From Pol
Pot's perspective. Sihanouk has already done his job, giving the
Khmer Rouge enough international legitimacy to survive the
decade-long Vietnamese interregnum. From Sihanouk's perspective, the Khmer Rouge have done their job, driving the
Vietnamese army from Cambodia. Their struggle for domestic
dominance will continue. But the history of the Indochinese
Wars suggests that Sihanouk will not be able to defeat the Khmer
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Rouge by himself.
Historical and Theoretical Implications
As we have seen. Cambodian leaders have used exile
government organizations both as object and subject. During the
Ftrst Indochinese War. Norodom Sihanouk's strategy reduced
the exile organizations to the status of objects to be manipulated
in his geopolitical contest with France. Pol Pot's strategy during
the Second Indochinese War made the exile organization the
subject, the nexus of the takeover, transmuting it into a regime.
The Third Indochinese War has seen a combination of these
approaches. with the outcome as yet uncertain. The outcome of
the Third Indochinese War hinges. at least in part, on how the
indices of legitimacy among the Khmer people have changed
across fifty years of conflict.

CQmpartson of Exile Tactics In Three Indochinese Wars
The long decades of warfare in Indochina during the
twentieth century created many crises for the leaders of Cambodia, and on many occasions their response has been to form an
exile government. Several points of comparison stand out from
this rich history. In all three wars, geographical hosts and
financial patrons were keys to success or failure in an exile
organizations quest for power. In all three wars, control of the
central symbols of nationhood was necessary to carry internal
legitimacy and international recognition: successful exile insurgency required at least the sympathy. if not the active support of
the King and the monks. Finally. across the three wars, the
revolutionary potential of the Khmer people has varied, from
moderate in the First Indochinese War, to intense in the Second,
to totally absent in the Third. This last observation suggests that
a transformation of the indices oflegitimacy is in progress among
the Khmer body politic.
In the Third Indochinese War, the various factions of the
CGDKman.ifest very different attitudes toward the people. As an
organization the CGDK is distinguished by it's lack of a role inthe
preservation of the diasportc Khmer nation and culture brought
on by the last two Indochinese Wars. Democratic Kampuchea
made it a special mission to exterminate most aspects of the
Khmer nation and culture, so it is not surprising that the DK
irredentists have played little role in preserving Khmer culture in
the diaspora to which they belong. Sann and Sihanouk's organizations, however. have done much in both the refugee camps and
in resettled Khmer exile communities abroad to preserve traditional Khmer religious and social rituals. art, and customs. For
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Sihanouk, thiS is necessary to remind people of his birthright.
There is no way to know what in fact is the Will of the
people of Cambodia . Certainly the CGDK as an entity cannot be
said to speak for the Khmer people. Beyond the common desire
for Vietnamese military Withdrawal, the CGDK has no coherent
program. Son Sann and the factions gathered under his KPNLF
umbrella represent some number of Cambodians. as by definition does Democratic Kampuchea. But these claims are negligible. from a cultural or hiStorical perspection. to the symbolic
value embodied in the person ofNorodom Sihanouk. The prince
may still rule the hearts of the people, even though a very high
percentage of them were not yet alive during Sihanouk's years in
power. Many remember the relative stability of his years in power
compared With the years since. It is probably remembered by
some as the idyllic jungle paradise of ante bellum Cambodian
mythology . The symbolic allure of the last. lost sovereign exerts
a powerful influence that perhaps even the unprecedented
brutality of the Khmer Rouge could not exterminate .
Norodom Sihanouk has flirted with and/or participated
in exile governments as a political technique for almost fifty
years . It is not surprising, then. that he should once again be
found at the center of exile political action in Cambodia . It would
be surprising if he could ever trust the Khmer Rouge again, or
even be expected to deal with them in good faith. He figures that
five of his children and fourteen of his grandchildren were killed
in various excesses of Democratic Kampuchea. Sihanouk has
spent years under house arrest at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.
and has seen them tear his "peaceful kingdom " assunder heaven
and earth. He describes his coalition partners simply by saying,
'They are not like us ."•• Once the Vietnamese have gone. it would
not be at all surprising if he finds the State of Cambodia a better
prospect for a coalition than his current partner , Democratic
Kampuchea.
International Dimension of Strate21c Choice
Sihanouk is again positioned to offer himself as the one
centrist and only legitimate solution to the decade-old "Kampuchea Problem ." But does he still embody the essence of the
Khmer nation in his person as he did twenty years ago? On the
one side, the domestically illegitimate but internationally recognized Democratic Kampuchea quietly prepares to shoot Its way
back into power. On the other side . the domestically legitimate
but internationally rejected Phnom Penh regime desparately negotiates With anybody who will listen for protection from Pol Pot
once the Vietnamese have gone . The Cambodians know what
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they want. have known for many years. and are not likely to
retreat from their various positions in the near future. Most of the
remaining latitude for strategic choice in the Third Indochinese
warbelongs to outside powers.
The Vietnamese made their choice. Under pressure from
a retrenching Soviet Union the Vietnamese accelerated their
planned withdrawal from Cambodia. It was a logical decision.
and a win-win choice. Militarily, they had passed the point of
dinlinishing returns when the resistance gave up trying to def end
fixed installations inside People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)
territory. The withdrawal will be popular not only with the
Cambodian public and the international community. but also
among the Vietnamese army, party and people. If need be, they
can always return. But the withdrawal constrains their latitude
for future decisions in important ways. reducing the Vietnamese
capacity to influence the shape of the next Cambodian government.
The choices available to the United States are also limited
by its past actions . It seems unlikely that the United States will
sustain its cynical policy of public condemnation and covert
support of Democratic Kampuchea through the conclusion of the
Third Indochinese War; the Bush administration has shown
some signs that a change may already be taking place. However.
the lengths to which the US might be willing to go in support of
a solution to the Kampuchea Problem again are limited by past
actions. and the resulting domestic political realities. US room
for maneuver has also been limited by a tendency to defer to the
presumably superior regional interests of an important strategic
ally, the People's Republic of China.
Thailand has played a crucial role in the survival of the
Khmer resistance factions through the Third Indochinese War.
The Thais have provided sanctuary to resistance fighters and
refugees , acted as host state to their political and military
organizations, supplied political and military intelligence. facilitated logistics for foreign military assistance, and exerted limited
combat support for border area operations. However, some
reports indicate that this type of Thai assistance to the CGDK
started to dwindle early in 1989. as Thai generals and politicians
began to reassess their interests." The Vietnamese military
withdrawal has calmed Thai security concerns. which are beginning to give way to the economic interests flowing from traditional cross-border trade patterns. This shift adds pressure on
the CGDK to achieve a settlement before Thai hospitality erodes
completely .
The only cards that really matter at the end of the Third
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Indochinese War are held by the Chinese Communist Party. The
Chinese relationship with the Soviet Union may dictate a reduction in tensions that could rebound to the benefit Sihanouk's
efforts to build a new coalition. The experience of the First and
Second Indochinese Wars, however, is that the Chinese prefer a
government in Cambodia that is not just independent of but
actually hostile to Vietnam. If the Chinese are consistent in the
Third Indochinese War, this will mean continued strong support
for an eventual return of the Democratic Kampuchean faction of
the resistance to national power in Cambodia.
The limitations on the national sovereignty of People's
Republic of Kampuchea - since April 1989 known as the State
of Cambodia - are substantial. This is why Prime Minister Hun
Sen has been desperately bargaining for Sihanouk's imprimatur.
Although the Cambodian leader is the youngest politician in the
entire drama, he appears to understand the fundamental fact
that domestic legitimation and international recognition are
historically conditioned. The People's Republic of Kampuchea
was judged guilty by association with Vietnam. The regime could
not achieve international recognition, despite a very substantial
improvement of the general welfare of the Khmer people. This
was the judgment of the international community, apparenlly in
support of the principle that states shall not be overthrown by
neighboring force of arms, no matter how unsavory the regime in
question. The new "State of Cambodia" has permitted participation by non-communist Khmer leaders such as In Tam, has
enshrined in its basic law free market and human rights principles, and has declared anew that Buddhism is the official
national religion. To the extent that this "glasnostic" behavior
continues, the State of Cambodia may be seen as a transitional
regime between the PRK and whatever post-occupation regime
emerges. 18
Is the legal Cambodian (exile) regime - Democratic
Kampuchea - really a state? Although it lacks control of the
national seat of government, Democratic Kampuchea seems to
have most of the other traditional attributes of a modem state.
DK citizens (refugees and soldiers). international recognition (the
UN, etc.). received embassies (ASEAN states, etc.), executive
organs (e.g., the Supreme Military Commission). and active
governance (again of the camps). Thus, it would seem that
Democratic Kampuchea is indeed a state according to traditional
definitions. Yet Democratic Kampuchea is not a nation-state. As
Aristotle recommended, the nature of a state can be inf erred from
the nature of its citizens. In this case, the citizens are the literally
imprisoned residents of DK controlled camps, and the soldiers of
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the NADK.There is no persuasive evidence whatsoever to suggest
that the people of Kampuchea at large claim DK as their own, and
much evidence to support precisely the contrary proposition.
consistent reports of summary execution are continuing to come
from the border areas. 1 • This is the same state whose national
anthem runs:
Bright red blood that covers the towns and plains
of Kampuchea, Our Motherland,
Sublime blood of workers and peasants,
Sublime blood of revolutionary men and women
.fighters,
The blood changing into unre enting hatred. 20

Whereas many exile organizations are thought of as stateless
nations (e.g., the Palestinians}, DK is the case of a nationless
state . Representing no more than the will of an elite cadre, a
nationless state makes for an excellent pawn in big power geopolitics. If a group as universally notorious as the Khmer Rouge
can successfully employ the government-in-exile technique not
once, but twice, then the technique may well be an extremely
effective form of political action in and of itself.
The organic sources of exile governments seem to lie in
the dynamics of international politics. As a mechanism for
practitioners of weak power politics to battle the intervention of
strong powers, exile government has repeatedly shown itself to
be a potent strategy in Indochina. As a mechanism to achieve
a voice in national debate for disenfranchised constituencies,
however, exile governments in Cambodia have been less effective. On balance, given the environments faced by and the goals
of Khmer politicians during all three Indochinese wars, the
strategy of exile government has been astonishingly effective.
However. as long as stronger neighbors view it as in their
interests to manipulate Cambodian politics by funding and
supporting insurgent movements, invading Cambodian territory, or otherwise working their will on this weak country,
Cambodians can know little peace.
Among Cambodians, Khmer myths are evolving in a way
that may be unprecedented in thousands of years of history.
Buddhism will never be the same as it always has been in
Cambodia; too much of the tradition was lost during the rule of
Pol Pot. Neither will the king, his court, and the associated
politics ever play the roles they always did in Cambodian affairs;
though Sihanouk has a credible heir in Prince Ranaridh, the
Khmer Rouge were able to destroy most of the people and
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artifacts giving life to the royal tradition. The symbolic extinction
of monarchy and monachy will have a profound effect on the
future political, social, and psychological topography of Cambodia. What effect this will have on the current struggle Willsoon
become clear.
Conclusion: Exile Government as a Form of Political Strugg le
In all three of the major Indochinese conflicts since 1940,
Khmer leaders declared formal exile governments. In the First
Indochinese War, Norodom Sihanouk used exile groups to
achieve independence from France and as a tool for the King to
practice his successful authoritarian politics of the center. In
the Second Indochinese War, an exile group used Sihanouk to
defeat the client regime of the United States, only to lose the
hard-won independence to Vietnam in the Third Indochinese
War. In that second war, the Khmer Rouge instituted a highly
sophisticated strategy, using Sihanouk's prestige to attract
peasants to their FUNK organization and international support
to their CRUNK exile government, while maintaining control of
events with their peasant army. The Khmer Rouge view their
exile government in the Third Indochinese War as manifestly
tactical. while Sihanouk plays it as a strategic game . The exile
organizations arising out of Third Indochinese War may yet
make a positive contribution to solution of the tortured "Kampuchean Problem." This constitutes a remarkable record of
accomplishment for weak state actors in big power politics.
Several factors stand out as significant from a comparison
across these experiences: host and patron states, control of the
symbols of nationalism, and domestic versus international
legitimation.
Consistent geographical hosts and financial and diplomatic patrons are a prerequisite for a successful Khmer exile
movement. The lack of steadfast patrons. in and of itself, was
sufficient to account for the failures of the exile movements of
the First Indochinese War. The Vietnamese in the case of the
Khmer Viet Minh, and the Thai's in the case of the Khmer
Issarak, both found it in their national interest to abandon
support for the exiles· aspiriations before the conclusion of the
peace. Similarly. analysts credit the considerable assistance of
hosts and patrons of Khmer exile movementsthe Vietnamese
and Chinese in the Second Indochinese War, and the Vietnamese. Thais and the Chinese in the Third - with key roles in the
progress of the movements. Vietnamese and Chinese support
for CRUNK was essential to success: Vietnamese military
support and Chinese diplomatic and financial support made the
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difference in the Second Indochinese War. Again, early in the
Third Indochinese War, Vietnamese arms brought exiles to
power in Cambodia as the People's Republic of Kampuchea. If
the CGDK succeeds in becoming a successor government to the
pRK. it will be due to the steadfast assistance the coalition has
received from Thai hosts and Chinese patrons. Alternatively,
shifting Thal perceptions of their interests may force the Khmer
exiles of the Third Indochinese War to be repatriated before a
solution emerges.
Control of the symbols of nationalism in Cambodia is also
crucial to the success of exile movements. For a hundred
generations or more. the King of Cambodia has represented to
the Khmer people something more than a sovereign. The GodKing wields supreme spiritual power as well. and as such. the
monarch is the symbolic center of Khmer society. Norodom
Sihanouk has played this role during all three major Indochinese conflicts of this century. In the First and Second Indochinese Wars, Sihanouk manipulated these symbols with skill,
brtnging himself to power in the first war and his coalition
partners to power in the second. In the Third Indochinese War,
it seems reasonable to expect that the outcome will be consistent with that of the previous two wars, at least in respect to the
symbolic potency of the former King.
To make an anology with mathematics. it seems that in
the Khmer case the degree of international legitimation attaching to an exile regime determines the domain or the structure of
Cambodian politics, while the degree of domestic legitimacy the
exile regime generates determines the range or the process of the
politics. In the First Indochinese War, great powers refused to
recognize the Khmer exile groups, allowing Sihanouk to dominate the exiles in international negotiations: his claim to
domestic legitimacy was strong enough to support his rule for
fifteen years. Similarly. in the Second Indochinese War,
Sihanouk's participation in the exile coalition lent enough
credibility to the exile government for it to win initial international acceptance upon victory in spite of the strong opposition
of both the United States and the Soviet Union: on the domestic
front. however. the extreme radicalism of the resulting state of
Democratic Kampuchea - including an uncompromising program to eradicate all vestiges of the monarchy and Buddhismsoon robbed DK of the Mandate of Heaven. In the Third
Indochinese War, the PRK's lack of international recognition
assured its eventual failure by creating the conditions necessary to sustain multiple armed challenges lo its rule: domestically, after the daily terror in Democratic Kampuchea. the PRK's
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moderate policies seemed to be enough to ensure a relative
degree of internal stability. even though the PRK was clearly
sponsored by Vietnam. Continued foreign sponsorship of multiple armed exile organizations, however. has defined the conflict structure imposed upon Cambodian politics through the
1980s. and beyond.
The key to the success of the Khmer Rouge during their
decade in exile has been their very survival. This they owe to
their Thai hosts and their Chinese patrons. Although they are
able to stroll the halls of the United Nations in New York draped
in the flag of their state, at home they are naked emperors. They
can claim international recognition. but domestic legitimacy
eludes them. The Khmer Rouge record on use-of-force assures
that domestic legitimacy will continue to elude them. The
Chinese have been careful to ensure that the Khmer Rouge
maintain the strongest army of all the Khmer factions, and the
Khmer Rouge know what to do with a good coercive apparatus.
The successful communist strategy of the Second Indochinese
War- control of the coercive apparatus, a broad based united
front organization including the symbolic sovereign. and denial
of the existence of the party-was
redeployed again in the Third
Indochinese War.
CGDK strategy for the Third Indochinese War founders
on the questions of sustaining internal conflict in Cambodia.
When one cuts through all of the diplomatic niceties, the Khmer
Rouge remain the legal rulers of Cambodia. According to the
over-whelming majority of the members of the United Nations,
Democratic Kampuchea is the sovereign state of Cambodia. It
seems unlikely that the Khmer Rouge will voluntarily relinquish
this claim to legitimacy and sovereignty. The only way for them
to move from dejure sovereignty to de facto sovereignty. however. is to resume and sustain violence within Cambodia in the
wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal. physically removing competing aspirants to power. This is where the coalition
government's strategy loses coherence. With the Vietnamese
out, Sihanouk seeks reconciliation among all Khmer while the
Khmer Rouge seek to def end the sovereignty of their Democratic
Kampuchean state. As the goals of Sihanouk and the Khmer
Rouge diverge, the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea loses it's source of moral - but not legal - legitimacy.
For many years various observers inside Kampuchea and
out have urged the People's Republic of China and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to resolve their differences in such a
fashion as to allow a settlement of the "Kampuchea Problem."
For seasoned observers of superpower politics. it should come
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as no surprise that when these powers finally find it in their
interest to begin to move toward a solution. the result would
appear to be heading for one of the most cynical and harmful
possible outcomes. The Vietnamese decision to pull out before
a political settlement has been completed leaves the door open
for a return of the Khmer Rouge. The Sino-Soviet Summit of May
l 989 left no reason for undue optimism on this score; the final
communique of the summit blandly intoned. "Tile Soviet Union
and China affirmed that they will make every effort for an early.
fair. and suitable resolution to the Cambodian issue by political
moves."" Subsequent efforts by Deng Xiaoping to purge moderates in the Chinese Communist Party positively suggest pessimism; Deng has long been a Pol Pot supporter. Strength on the
ground is often decisive and this factor weighs in favor of the
Democratic Kampuchean irredentists. Still. Sihanouk's symbolic power is the trump card in Cambodian politics. The
stability of any mediated solution to the problem would depend
heavily on international guarantees. backed up with force. to
alleviate mischief by a revanchist Khmer Rouge. However.
experience in other conflicts suggests that peace-keeping troops
can only keep a peace that has already been established. The
Namibia-style solution proposed by the U .N. Security Council in
January 1990 will be severely tested by the Cambodian legacy
of political violence. Though the Third Indochinese Warmaywell
be drawing to an end. this does not necessarily imply the establishment of peace in Cambodia.
At the present Juncture the fate of the people of Kampuchea seems to depend to a large extent on Chinese policy. It is
mainly Chinese support that has allowed the Khmer Rouge to
endure their defeat and decade of exile. and the Chinese more
than anyone else are favorably positioned to effect some control
of the Khmer Rouge. Continued Chinese military aid may enable
the Khmer Rouge to regenerate their totalitarian control of
Cambodia. If the Chinese were to resist the temptation to
continue this support. and if a face-saving formula could be
found to permit the Phnom Penh factions and the non-communist resistance factions to rally to Sihanouk as a symbol of the
center. and if international aid to the new regime was forthcoming to resist Khmer Rouge military encroachments, the Khmer
people might yet know peace in this century. But that is a lot of
ifs.

The more likely outcome of the Third Indochinese War,
consistent with that of the First and Second Wars. is the exile
organizations will again succeed in transforming the conditions
of Cambodian conflict from external threat to civil war. The
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conference convened in Palis in August 1989 - ostensibly
called to settle the Third Indochinese War - ended with
characteristic ambiguity. Sihanouk resigned as head of the
coalition: the Khmer Rouge demonstrated unexpectedly heavy
firepower in early dry -season border battles; the Chinese threatened trouble if the Khmer Rouge were excluded from any
settlement: and the foreign secretaries of the U.S .. U.S.S.R.,
China and Britain boycotted the final sessions. Summing up the
lack of substantive progress at the Palis talks. Sihanouk at one
point quipped. "We Khmer love to fight. We'll cooperate later. M22
The history of Khmer exile behavior over the course of three
Indochinese wars in the last fifty years gives one pause to
wonder how much longer the Khmer people will have to wait for
cooperation among Khmer leaders. and how much more war lies
between now and then.
~e author would like to thank Douglas Pike and Yossi Shain
for helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this
paper. The views expressed remain solely those of the author.
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